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Ungendering Justice
Constituting a Court, Securing a Conviction,
Creating a Human Right
Debra Bergoffen
American University
dbergoff@gmu.edu
That rape and sexual enslavement of Muslim women and girls was
used as an ethnic cleansing strategy by the Bosnian-Serbs in the wars
in the former Yugoslavia is now well known. On February 22, 2001
when the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
the ICTY, convicted three Bosnian-Serb soldiers of crimes against
humanity for this tactic, its verdict was hailed as groundbreaking. It
signaled that the business as usual dismissal of war-time rape as a
matter of boys being boys or collateral damage was at an end. Less
well known are the forces that converged to make this conviction
possible. Less discussed are the radical implications of this judgment
and the promise it holds for uncovering the gender biases of
international law and challenging them.
The February 22, 2001 verdict, in what is known as the
Kunarac case, was the culmination of a trial that was groundbreaking
from beginning to end. First was the unique nature of the indictment.
This was the first war crimes trial that dealt exclusively with rape,
sexual abuse and sexual enslavement. It was the first indictment that
clearly distinguished rape from torture. The nature of the proceedings
was also distinctive. In addition to defining rape in terms of criteria
of consent rather than force, so that rape was understood in terms of
unwanted rather than forced penetration, the Court distinguished
genuine consent from apparent consent, indicating that the context
of the situation established whether or not genuine consent was
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possible. It noted that situations characterized by power imbalances,
for example, the relationship between a civilian and a soldier, or
imbued with threats, for example, terrorizing a civilian population,
made genuine consent impossible. It also made the woman's
experience of what happened to her body rather than the man's
explanation of what was going on in his mind (I thought her no
meant yes. I took her silence as consent) the determining factor in
deciding whether or not a rape occurred. In this way the Court
acknowledged the woman's epistemic authority—her right to define
and bear witness to her experience. Finally, the verdict. In finding
the soldiers guilty the court cited two principles. One principle stated
that that men of substance do not abuse women. The other cited the
women's human right to sexual self-determination. Though the first
principle is somewhat conservative insofar as it reinforces the
gendered ideology of men as protectors of women, the second is
radical—it effectively creates a new human right—the right to sexual
integrity. In creating this right it reframes human rights discourses.
Instead of being invoked to defend the dignity of the invulnerable
body, a body traditionally gendered male, they now need to be seen
as affirming the dignity of the vulnerable body, a body traditionally
gendered female.
In this piece, I take a closer look at the forces that converged
to make this groundbreaking judgment possible and, using this case
as a case study, I consider the radical and promising implications of
appealing to human rights to affirm the dignity of the vulnerable
body.
Constituting a Court
On May 25, 1993 the UN Security Council, judging that the wars in
the former Yugoslavia were a threat to international peace and
security, established the ICTY. The Court was expected to restore
peace and security by prosecuting violations of established
international war crimes and humanitarian law and by strengthening
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existing legal codes.1 Given this expectation and the fact that most of
the ICTY judges were academics interested in developing
international law and institutions we might say that the Kunarac
indictment, in taking the radical steps of focusing on the gendered
criminality of the Bosnian-Serb genocide strategy, in reformulating
the criteria of rape and in creating a human right to sexual self
determination, did what the Security Council expected it to do.2
Catherine MacKinnon had high expectations for the Court.
Speaking at the Yale Law School in April 1994 she declared: “The
ICTY stands poised to develop an international jurisprudence of
sexual assault as integral to the law of nations for the first time.”3 She
based her expectations on the statute that established the ICTY –
especially on the differences of this statue from those of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo courts. Unlike these post World War II
courts whose directives were either silent on the issues of rape and
forced prostitution, or only saw rape as a species of torture, the ICTY
statute specifically named rape and forced prostitution as
prosecutable crimes. Further, Rule 96 of the ICTY statute stipulated
that no corroboration was required in sexual assaults, that consent
was not an acceptable defense, and that no evidence of prior sexual
conduct was admissible.4 MacKinnon also believed that women’s
demands for accountability played a role in the structuring of the
court, and that given these demands and the court’s statutes, the
ICTY had an historic opportunity to identify rape as a human rights
violation.5
Despite their different charges, the Tokyo and Nuremberg
courts and the ICTY faced similar situations—they were charged
with prosecuting war-time actions that had yet to be identified as
criminal in international law. Both courts had to push the edges of
Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise
in Law Politics and Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3.
2 Ibid., 34, 95.
3 Catherine MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 178.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 191.
1
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established law to transform the criminality of a national and military
policy into a punishable international offense. In the case of the
Nuremburg court, the sovereign right of a nation to deal with its own
citizens without interference from other states had to be identified as
a violation of humanitarian law. In the case of the ICTY, the use of
rape as a war strategy had to be criminalized as an illegal weapon.
The Nuremburg court redrew the lines of sovereign immunity. The
ICTY redefined the crime of rape and in the process of rejecting
prevalent definitions of rape and sexual assault exposed the gendered
assumptions and injustices of these definitions.
Securing a Conviction
Unlike the recently named crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing,
rape has been a recognized war crime for centuries. While the crimes
of genocide and ethnic cleansing needed to be named to become
legally visible, the legally visible crime of war time rape was rendered
empirically invisible first by gendered norms of epistemic credibility
that establish men’s reading of events as objective and rational (thus
meeting the rational man legal standard) and women’s accounts as
emotional and suspicious (thus failing to meet the rational legal
standard of credible evidence); second by masculine myths of
sexuality that legitimate men’s aggressive sexual behaviors as natural;
third by myths of femininity that portray women as desiring sexually
aggressive men; and fourth by unspoken military codes that accept
rape as a spoil of war.
Ignoring reports of rape, and calling rape something else
(collateral damage, consensual sex, letting off steam) are common
ways of making rape disappear. Legally, the invisibility of rape is
aided and abetted by equating rape with torture. The endurance of
the tradition that identifies rape with torture relies on several factors:
men determining the meaning of rape (including the circumstances in
which sexual intercourse can be called rape); rules of shame and
modesty that, in ensuring women’s silence, ensured that men’s
account of what counts as rape would not be challenged; and ideas of
violation that measure harm by the standard of the masculine
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autonomous body such that absent cuts, bruises, or wounds, no harm
can be claimed.
These extra legal factors led to legal standards that, in
equating rape with torture, held that a rape could only be said to
occur if there was evidence of physical violence. This standard of
rape reduces it to a matter among men. It takes no account of the
raped woman’s experience of having been abused and violated. It
can hold only as long as men’s voices dominate public discourse; as
long as codes of femininity silence women; and as long as women
who do speak lack epistemic authority. The ICTY made the crime of
rape legally and empirically visible by paying attention to the raped
women’s experience and challenging the men’s accounts. In its
sentencing decree, it went so far as to argue that Kunarac’s and
Kovač’s false defenses, Kunarac’s claim that a nineteen year old girl
seduced him, and Kovač’s invented account of his relationship with
Witness #87, constituted aggravating factors and should be
considered in their punishment. In listening to the women, the Court
refused to equate the absence of bruises with the absence of abuse.
It signaled that men’s account of sexual relationships would not go
uncontested.
The lawyers defending the soldiers in the Kunarc case relied
on the equation of rape with torture to argue that the prosecution did
not prove that the alleged victims of rape were exposed to any severe
physical or psychological suffering: that rape in itself is not an act that
inflicts severe bodily pain and therefore that no crime against
humanity occurred.6 In effect, the defense argued that if the Court
wished to include rape in the category of crimes against humanity it
would have to identify rape with the violence and pain associated
with torture, and that if the Court defined rape without reference to
this understanding of violence and pain it could not establish rape as
a crime against humanity. Given accepted legal definitions of rape
and crimes against humanity, there was nothing amiss in the defense
lawyers’ logic. Their argument failed not because the Court rejected
6 Marlise Simons, “Three Serbs Convicted in Wartime Rapes,” New York Times, 22
Feb. 2001.
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the defense lawyer’s reasoning but because, attending to the women’s
accounts of rape, it contested the assumptions of the defense lawyer’s
arguments. Listening to the women, it refused to accept the
traditional understandings of rape, torture and crimes against
humanity. Without discounting the matter of physical and
psychological suffering, the Court found that the crucial issue in
determining whether or not a criminal act rises to the level of a crime
against humanity concerns the matter of human dignity. The
women’s testimonies convinced the Court that sexual integrity and
human dignity are too tightly intertwined to be separable. Violating
one violates the other.
The indictment, in distinguishing rape from torture, should
have alerted the defense lawyers to the futility of their tactic. Rather
than accepting the indictment as a warning against their “rape must
be the equivalent of torture to be considered a crime against
humanity” strategy, however, the defense lawyers challenged the
validity of the indictment and the objectivity of the judge. This
becomes clear in their appeal. Here the defense argued that Judge
Florence Mumba’s prior denunciations of rape and sexual slavery in
the Balkan war, her previous statements urging a broader definition
of rape, and her earlier experience as a former representative of
Zambia to the UN Commission on the Status of Women, tainted her
ability to be an impartial judge. The Appeals Chamber rejected this
argument. It found that Judge Mumba’s experience and insights
made her uniquely qualified to hear the case. The Appeals Chamber
recognized that the trial court, first in distinguishing rape from
torture, second in insisting that reports of rape be thoroughly
investigated, and third in mandating that those accused of rape and
sexual slavery face the bench, brought a gendered eye to the evidence
before it. It did not, however, find that this gendered eye was
prejudicial. Instead it found that the Court, in paying attention to the
dynamics of sex and gender, would take account of realities that a
“neutral” eye might ignore, and that its judgments would reflect a
more complete assessment of the situation.
A gendered eye could see what an “objective” eye would not
notice: rape, insofar as it is a physical phenomenon, is a crime that
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.2, 2013, 45-58
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can be committed by men or women against women and men. In a
world where one’s gender did not carry cultural and symbolic
baggage, rape, if it occurred, would be a non-gendered sexual crime.
In our gendered world, however, rape is predominantly a crime
committed by men against women. The statistics are clear. In times
of war, rape is disproportionately a crime committed by military men
against civilian women. In times of peace it is disproportionately a
crime committed by men against women. In times of war it cannot
be adequately addressed through the gender neutral concept of
torture. This was especially true in the ethnic cleansing campaign in
the Balkans. The Bosnian-Serb command ordered the systematic
rape, not the torture, of Muslim women and girls.
To adequately respond to the realities of the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia, the ICTY had to distinguish rape from torture.
To understand the motives, effects and criminality of the genocide
rape strategy, the Court needed to be alert to the ways that rape and
torture, despite their strong family resemblance, constitute different
violations of our humanity. The distinction between rape and torture
is twofold. First, rape, unlike torture is a specific sexual assault. So
long as rape is considered as a species of torture, we will fail to see
the ways that our dignity as persons is inexorably tied to our dignity
as sexual beings. Second, rape, unlike torture, is a gendered and
symbolic crime. It depends on accepted gender codes both for its
effectiveness as a military strategy and for the fact that, whether or
not it is part of an officially ordered policy, rapists expect to be
immune from prosecution.
The Bosnian-Serb ethnic cleansing/genocide strategy paid
attention to the difference between rape and torture. The men were
tortured and disappeared or murdered. The women were raped,
sexually assaulted, and sometimes, but not always, tortured or
murdered. The Court also paid attention to the difference. It
distinguished the war crime of torture from the war crime of rape,
identifying each in its own right as a human rights violation. Though
it broke with common practice in its attention to the gendered
dimensions of the Bosnian-Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, it also
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followed accepted legal principles in noting the gendered realties of
war time rape as articulated in the Geneva Conventions.
There is a certain irony in the fact that the Geneva
Conventions, in providing the precedent for the Court’s gendered
indictment, also provided the script for using women’s bodies as
instruments of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Article 75 of Protocol I
of the Geneva Conventions identifies forced prostitution and
indecent assault as an outrage on personal dignity, an outrage that
would apply equally to men and women. Article 76, however, speaks
of women as deserving special respect. It says that women in
particular must be protected against rape and indecent assault, and
that special protection is owed them and their small children.7
Articles 27 and 14 of the Geneva Convention are more specific.
According to Article 27 “Rape, enforced prostitution, e.g. the forcing
of a woman into immorality by violence or threats and any form of
indecent assault... are and remain prohibited... and women... have an
absolute right to respect for their honour and modesty, in short for
their dignity as women.”8 Article 14 states that women shall be
treated with all the regard due to their sex. Commenting on Article
14, Cherif Bassiouni, a member of the commission that established
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, notes that this
means taking women’s weakness, and the need to protect them into
consideration.9
Reading these protocols closely, we see that the meaning of a
raped woman’s body is not commensurate with the meaning of a
raped man’s body. It cannot be understood simply as an indecent
assault or as an outrage on her personal dignity. Matters of her
morality, modesty, honour, and weakness, that is, her need for special
protection, are issues that concern her entire community. A raped
woman’s body implicates her people, specifically its men, for it is the
men who are charged with protecting and guaranteeing “their”
women’s dignity. Her honour cannot be separated from theirs.
7 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 357-358.
8 Ibid., 352-353.
9 Ibid., 356.
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Raping a woman is an assault on the men of her community. Her
raped body is a writing pad upon which men send messages of
emasculation and hyper masculinity to each other.
I think that it is important to see the role that the idea of
women’s modesty plays in these conventions. There is an important
relationship being established between women’s modesty, honour,
integrity and dignity, and their need to be protected. In relying on
traditional rules of modesty to make the case for the special
criminality of heterosexual rape, the Conventions reflect and
reinforce traditional gender geographies. Positioning women as
needing special attention and identifying the special protection they
need with the special protection due to children establishes an
uncomfortable analogy between women and children. Both need to
be looked after. The logic of special protection of women differs
from the logic of the special protection for children, however, once
the idea of modesty is introduced. Women cannot, without
compromising their modesty or risking their protection and
reputation, enter the public domain to bear witness to their
experience. Her testimony comes at the price of her modesty. It
carries the cost of being shamed by her people and becoming
ashamed of herself. It is not just the fear of losing their protection
that keeps women from speaking out; it is the shame of having been
exposed that keeps them silent. Thus the gendered protection racket
and the fear of being shamed ensure that a woman’s experience of
rape will be filtered through and defined by the words of men.
Creating a new Human Right
The court’s finding of guilt is clear. It establishes that the well worn
defenses of war-time rape and sexual abuse, are no longer acceptable.
In rejecting the usual excuses, the court invoked two principles. One
principle refers to men and their responsibility to women. It declares
that, “In time of peace as much as in time of war, men of substance
do not abuse women.”10 The other principle refers to women and
their rights. It links women’s dignity to their “fundamental human
10

Simons, “Three Serbs Convicted in Wartime Rapes.”
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right to sexual self-determination.”11 The man of substance principle
defers to the traditional gendered idea of women as weak and
vulnerable. It accepts the standard meaning of war time rape as a
violation of women’s unique vulnerability. By finding that men are
responsible for ensuring that women are not abused this aspect of the
ruling implicitly reiterates the Geneva Convention’s idea that
women’s honor and modesty requires special protection. The second
principle of the Court’s verdict, the affirmation of the women's
human right to sexual self-determination, however, is silent on the
question of women’s honor and modesty and says nothing about
men’s responsibility to protect women. Between what this principle
says—women have a right to sexual self determination—and what it
does not say—men are not held responsible for protecting this
right—the Court challenges gender codes that legitimate women’s
vulnerability to men’s power
In reminding men of their obligation not to abuse women
and insisting that the conditions of war do not absolve them of this
obligation, the Court accepts the fact that men can abuse women. It
positions men as having the obligation to protect women from men’s
abuse without asking how men acquired the power to abuse women
and without asking why women need male protection. Whether the
Court thinks that men’s power to protect women is a matter of
natural/biological or social factors, it is clear that it expects men of
substance to protect women from abuse first by disciplining
themselves (they should not do what they can do, they should not
abuse women) and then by disciplining other men (they should not
allow other men to do what men can do). In a military situation, this
is a chain of command issue. Officers are expected to use the power
of their rank to model the man of substance ideal to those under
their command. They are expected to train their men to protect
civilian women. This includes preventing rape and sexual abuse. In
“Judgement of Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković Case,” The
Hague, 22 February 2001 JL/P.I.S./566-e, 6; available from
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Kunarac/tjug/en/010222_Kunarac_Kovačc_Vukov
ic_summary_en.pdf.
11
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times of peace where there is no chain of command and no military
discipline to enforce the men of substance rule, it is a matter of
personal responsibility. In pointing to the flawed character and
criminality of men who fail to protect women from other men’s or
their own aggression, this men of substance principle may be seen as
deflecting attention from the criminality of gender codes that
legitimate women’s vulnerability to men’s power. By invoking the
sexual self-determination principle, however, the Court indicates that
it is not altogether blind to the fact that patriarchal gender structures
must be named as an accomplice to the crime of war time rape. By
speaking of her dignity rather than his responsibility, the sexual self
determination principle shifts our attention from the perpetrator to
his victim. In linking women’s dignity to their “fundamental human
right to sexual self-determination”, the court rejects the protectorprotected sexual contract. It affirms the principle of embodied
subjectivity as it attends to the sexed realities of embodiment,
something ignored in previous crimes against humanity judgments.12
The Court does not claim to be doing anything radical. It
acts as though it is merely articulating the obvious fact that sexual
integrity cannot be severed from human integrity such that an assault
on one is necessarily an assault on the other. It does not flag the fact
that it is only by its judgment that a relationship between sexual and
human integrity is being established in international law.
The effects of establishing the human right to sexual self
determination are difficult to predict. If the idea of self determination
is allowed to slide into the idea of autonomy, creating a right to
sexual self determination may have little effect on the autonomous
subject’s place in human rights discourses. Insofar as the right to
sexual self determination directs us to think of the self as existing in
relationship with and vulnerable to others, however, it may get us to
reassess our love affair with the autonomous subject. If the newly
created right to sexual self determination is read as a challenge to the
way that we have read rights as inhering within individuals rather
than as existing between them, it will inaugurate a paradigm shift
12

Ibid.
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where the subject of rights, instead of being understood in terms of
the first person singular autonomous I, will be understood in terms
of the first person plural corporeal, sexed, intersubjective and
vulnerable we.
Given that to have political effects, re-conceiving the subject
of human rights must engage the discourse of the law, we need to
return to the ICTY verdict to see how the law can become
instrumental in advocating a politics of intersubjective embodied
vulnerability. The Kunarac verdict invokes two distinct ways of
criminalizing gendered violence. It cites the language of individual
responsibility bequeathed to it by liberal social contract theorists to
contest the idea of the autonomous subject this language traditionally
supports. In creating the human right to sexual self-determination,
the Court appealed to the familiar language of autonomy to evoke the
idea of the vulnerable subject. The particulars of the Court’s
judgment make it clear that the issue of individual responsibility
weighs heavily in its findings.
Though the court finds that the rapes were part of a
systematic campaign to terrorize Muslims in ways that would make it
impossible for them to return to the region; and though it finds that
the soldiers knew of the systematic transfer of women to detention
centers where they were sexually abused; it rejects the claim that the
defendants were following orders. In the court’s words, “...the
evidence shows free will on their part.”13 Struggling to account for
this free will, the Court notes that the armed conflict offered blanket
impunity to the perpetrators and called them “lawless
opportunists.”14 It describes the accused soldiers as morally
depraved, corrupt men who relished exercising absolute power. But
the Court cannot decide whether the conditions of war created the
opportunity for criminal personalities to flourish or whether war
itself, in marking certain people as enemies, seduced moral men into
committing immoral acts. Thus while it finds that “evidence shows
the effect a criminal personality will have in war on helpless members
13
14

Ibid., “Kunarac Summary Judgement,” 2.
Ibid., 3.
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of the civilian population”, it also notes that, “the three accused are
men with no criminal past. However they thrived in the dark
atmosphere of the dehumanization of those believed to be
enemies.”15 If the Court cannot decide how to account for the
unforced behavior of these free willed men, it has no trouble
categorizing their actions: they are criminal. In peacetime, the Court
notes, they would be cited as organized crime.16
It is, I think, important to note that even when the Court is
focused on the criminality of the perpetrators, it does not sever their
culpability from the ways that the structure of war, in dehumanizing
those identified as enemies, creates favorable conditions for the
soldiers’ crimes. While the Court does what the law is charged with
doing, assessing individual culpability, responsibility and guilt, its
opinion, in critiquing the discourses of war and enemies, allows us to
see the ways that the sexual self determination principle situates the
rights and responsibilities of the individual within their structural
contexts.
Though the men of substance principle appears regressive
insofar as it does not address the structural violence that enables and
encourages the practice of genocidal rape, the Muslim women’s
testimonies make it painfully clear that it is by individuals, not social
forces, that structural violence is perpetrated and suffered. Standing
alone, the men of substance principle could be seen as limiting the
function of the law to that of assessing individual culpability,
responsibility and guilt. Joined with the right to sexual self
determination principle, however, the man of substance principle
positions the law as having the authority to recognize the culpability
of those who materialize social codes through their individual actions.
The Court’s verdict does not pit the significance of the
individual against the importance of established norms. Rather, it
appeals to existing norms of responsibility to rework the norms of
criminality. Holding individual solders responsible for their actions
by finding that they failed to respect the sexual integrity, rather than
15
16

Ibid.
Ibid., 2.
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the honor, of the raped women, the court transformed the war time
crime of rape from the violation of the gendered status of a woman
to the violation of the humanity of vulnerability. The two principles
of the verdict refer us to the ongoing exchange between anonymous
social structures and the individual lives structured by them. They
show us that unless these structures are critiqued individuals will
continue to unreflectively reinforce them. They also show us that
because it is individuals who give these structures life they can be
critiqued and changed. Where the men of substance principle alerts
us to the importance of individual responsibility, the sexual integrity
principle requires that we critique current ways of assessing who is
responsible for what. The Court finds the logic of the enemy
responsible for the Bosnian-Serb soldiers’ abuse of women’s
vulnerability and invokes the principle of genuine consent to hold
them accountable for their violence. The court, in refusing to
exonerate men, who use the logic of the enemy as a shield for their
crimes, appeals to two lines of logic to find them guilty of crimes
against humanity: the logic of gendered protection codes (men of
substance) and the logic of human rights (sexual self-determination).
As these logics circle each other, they expose the ways that our
current gender codes are invitations to genocidal rape campaigns.
They warn us that those who accept these invitations are guilty of
crimes against humanity.
And so it comes/came to this: a Court that brought a
gendered eye to justice, that used this eye to expose the gendered
biases of the law, ungendered the stigma of vulnerability and
introduced us to the ungendered justice of the dignity of the
vulnerable body.
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